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ABSTRACT
This article discusses the causes and potential consequences of the high legislative turnover in Estonia, 
Latvia, and Lithuania in the period from 1990 onwards. The main findings from the subject-
related literature are being confronted with the data on the Baltic parliamentary recruitment. The 
analysis leads to the conclusion that the path dependence (length of the previous non-democratic 
regime) and the supply-side volatility are the most convincing explanations for the high turnover 
among Baltic legislators. 
The personnel turnover of the formal governmental institutions (circulation of elites) is often 
seen as an explanatory variable for the change and stability of a political order (Bottomore 
1993: 44). Democratic elitists claim that liberal democracy has elitist foundations (Higley 
and Burton 2006) and  provide evidence that consolidated democracy, differently from 
other types of political regimes, is related to “classic elite circulation” (Higley and Lengyel 
2000: 7). 
The concern of Pareto as well as of the current scholars working on western democracies1 
seems to be a low individual turnover of elites. We can find a passage where the circulation of 
elites is compared with “the river flooding and breaking its banks”, but this happens because 
of the too slow elite circulation, which causes revolutions (Pareto 1966: 250). 
The primary concern of this article, as well as of the studies on Eastern European 
democracies (Best and Edinger 2003; Crowther and Matonyte 2007), however, is about the 
high individual turnover of parliamentary elites and its potential consequences. In order to 
say whether the elite turnover is high or low and what it indicates, a more precise scale of 
measurement is required. To measure individual turnover among parliamentary elites, I will 
use the benchmark based on the empirical longitudinal data from many European democracies 
(Figure 1).
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1 See Matland and Studlar 2004;  Somit et al. 1994.
30  Mindaugas Kuklys





Complete or near to complete changes of political order (regime 
discontinuity)
(1) Restricted systemic changes (e.g., changes of the electoral system)
(2) Volatile elite structures linked to the transformation of the party 
system at large
Normal level of exchange
Trend towards development of oligarchical structures
FIGURE 1. Levels of elite circulation
Source: adapted from Best, Hausmann and Schmitt (2000: 184 –185).
From 1990 onwards, the turnover of Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian parliamentary 
representatives declines2, and each consecutive parliamentary election brings more 
experienced MPs. However, the general level of legislative turnover, like in other countries 
of Eastern Europe,3 remains high for each election taken separately and amounts to 55.5% 
of newcomers for the last six terms in Estonia, 54.5% in Latvia,4 and 52.8% on average 
in Lithuania. The mean number of successive mandates – another indicator for elite 
circulation; – rises in all three countries, however, the average of 1.6 for Estonia and Latvia 
and 1.7 for Lithuania is significantly lower than the western European average of 2.5 mandates 
(Cotta and Best 2000: 505).
Since the table in Fig. 1 suggests that the most normal level of elite change is between 
20% and 40%, it is clear that Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, as well as other Eastern European 
countries with their higher elite turnover do not fall into this category. 
The main question is: How could this high turnover be explained? How long could it 
continue? What does it indicate? What are its causes and potential consequences?
The literature suggests that a high elite circulation indicates (1) restricted systemic 
changes, (2) volatile elite structures (Best, Hausmann, Schmitt 2000: 184–185), and (3) signifies 
a political crisis (Putnam 1976: 65). A high legislative turnover could be caused by (4) electoral 
system, (5) electoral volatility, (6) double listing of candidates, (7) frequency of elections, and 
(8) voluntary exits such as dissatisfaction with being a legislator, desire to retire or pursue a 
private career (Matland and Studlar 2004: 87). On the side of potential consequences, a high 
circulation of MPs might be interpreted as (9) greater chances for a system’s innovativeness 
2  Exceptions: the Estonian Riigikogu of 1999 and 2003, the Latvian Saeima of 1998 and 2010, and the Lithuanian 
Seimas of 2000. 
3  Legislative turnover in post-communist Eastern Europe fluctuates at the level between 50% and 75% which 
is almost two times higher than in most democracies of Western Europe (Best and Edinger 2003: 6).
4  If the parliament of 1990 with the 92.5% rate of newcomers (Dreifelds 1996: 66) is included, the average for 
all seven terms would be 59.9%. In case we treat absolutely all MPs elected in 1990 as newcomers, the turnover 
reaches the level of 61%.
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and flexibility in terms of policy, (10) greater opportunities in attaining elite status, and (11) 
the lower average level of elite experience, expertise, and effectiveness (Putnam 1976: 65-67). 
1. LEGISLATIVE TURNOVER IN THE BALTICS 
The legislative turnover indicates to what extent we observe a renewal or continuity of 
legislative elites and – in case of political party families – whether some party families bring 
more parliamentary newcomers than others.5
E s t o n i a
The average share of parliamentary newcomers in Estonia for the last six elections is 55.5%, 
i.e. slightly below the Eastern European average (57.8%) for the last four parliaments: 
there were 68.8% of parliamentary newcomers in the second, 54.1% in the third, 
53.9% in the fourth, and 54.3% in the fifth post-communist parliaments of Eastern Europe on 
the average (Edinger 2010: 145). If we look for incumbency rates, we see that only 37.3% of 
the Riigikogu members on average get re-elected. Surprisingly enough, the share of Estonian 
5  In order to maximise the comparability, the political parties of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have been 
classified according to the scheme of Gallagher, Laver, and Mair (2006). The founding (competitive but not multi-
party) elections of 1990 are excluded from the subsequent calculations in Tables 1 to 3 since the parliamentary 
elite change in 1990 by definition amounted to 100%. 
TABLE 1. Parliamentary newcomers: Estonia
ELECTION 1992 1995 1999 2003 2007 2011
Party Families N % N % N % N % N % N %
Communists ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­
Social Dem. 8 66.7 2 33.3 10 58.8 4 66.7 2 20 9 47.4
Greens 0 0 ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ 6 100 ­­­ ­­­
Agrarians ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ 2 28.6 7 53.8 1 16.7 ­­­ ­­­
Left Liberals 14 82.4 29 50.9 22 78.6 14 50 16 55.2 10 38.5
Right Liberals 0 0 11 57.9 6 24 11 57.9 19 61.3 14 42.4
Conservatives 23 79.3 2 15.4 10 55.6 29 82.9 5 26.3 5 21.7
Extreme Right 18 100 ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­
Ethnic Minority ­­­ ­­­ 5 83.3 4 66.7 ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­
Other 8 100 ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­
No Party ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­
Liberals ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­
Christian Dem. ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­
Popular Front 10 66.7 ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­
TOTAL 81 80.2 49 48.5 54 53.5 65 64.4 49 48.5 38 37.6
Source: Own calculations.
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newcomers is higher than the average share of newcomers in the Latvian  and Lithuanian 
parliaments, in spite of the fact that the Estonian party system is considered the most stable 
and consolidated and having the lowest electoral volatility among the Baltic states (see Pettai 
and Kreuzer 1999; Pettai 2010).
If we move onto the political party family level,  the largest shares of parliamentary 
newcomers are observed among Extreme Right and Other (Independent Royalists) in 
1992, Ethnic Minority in 1995, Left Liberals in 1999, Conservatives in 2003, Greens in 2007, 
and Social Democrats in 2011. The largest absolute numbers of newcomers came with 
Conservatives in 1992 and 2003, Left Liberals in 1995 and 1999, and Right Liberals in 2007 and 
2011. Conservatives, Left and Right Liberals were also electoral winners in the above indicated 
years. Hence, our data clearly demonstrate that the largest number of newcomers comes with 
the winners of the parliamentary elections. 
If one differentiates between ethnic minority and ethnic majority legislators, one finds 
that a higher turnover is observed among ethnic minority MPs.
The high legislative turnover in Estonia provides for a higher accessibility of the elite and 
its permeability by non-elites. In comparison with countries having a low legislative turnover, 
politicians in Estonia have better chances to acquire the elite status. High legislative turnover 
can be interpreted as greater chances for political system’s innovativeness and flexibility 
in terms of policy, but also as an indication of the lower average level of elite experience, 
expertise, and effectiveness and as a sign of political crisis (Putnam 1976: 65–66). 
It has been noted, that “turnover within an elite institution tends to decline as the 
institution ages” (Putnam 1976: 65–66). In comparison with the first post-independence 
election, legislative turnover rates in Estonia declined indeed, however, they still remain high 
in comparison with legislative rates in western democracies. Western European countries 
stabilised their legislative turnover rapidly after the Second World War (Best and Cotta 2000; 
Cotta and Best 2007), however, Estonia, as well as most of Eastern Europe, twenty years after 
regime change continues rejecting more than half of its legislators in every election. This 
makes us wonder what keeps the political system together and whether the political system 
functions in conditions of a permanent crisis. 
L a t v i a
From 1990 onwards, the turnover of Latvian parliamentary representatives declines, and each 
consecutive parliamentary election brings more experienced MPs: the share of parliamentary 
newcomers fell from 68% in 1993 to 58% and 52% in 1998 and 2002, respectively, finally 
reaching a “western” level of 38% in 2006. 
The share of newcomers among Latvian party families is constantly above 40% except for 
the Liberals in 1995 and 1998, Conservatives and Social Democrats in 1995 and 2006, and 
Christian Democrats in 2006. The highest percentages of newcomers have been observed 
among Agrarians, Christian Democrats and Extreme Right in 1993, Agrarians in 1995, Christian 
Democrats in 1998 and 2002, Agrarians in 2006 and Extreme Right in 2010. The highest absolute 
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numbers of newcomers were brought to the parliament by Liberals in 1993, Extreme Right 
in 1995, Conservatives and Social Democrats in 1998, and Conservatives in 2002, 2006, and 
2010. Most of these party families brought the highest absolute numbers of women to those 
parliaments as well: Liberals brought 4 female MPs (22.2% of all women in the parliament) in 
1993, Extreme Right brought 2 female MPs (25%) in 1995, Conservatives brought 7 women 
(41.2%) in 1998, 15 women (83.3%) in 2002, and 15 women (78.9%) in 2006. Out of those 4 
liberal females, 3 were newcomers. One out of two extreme right women, 4 out of 7 in 1998 
and 12 out of 15 conservative women in 2002 were newcomers. This suggests a positive link 
between a high legislative turnover and a better representation of gender.6
L i t h u a n i a
The percentage of newcomers among Lithuanian party families is constantly above 30% 
except for the Christian Democrats and Ethnic Minority in 1996, Conservatives in 2000 and 
2012, and the Extreme Right in 2004, Socialists/Social Democrats in 2004 and 2008, and 
Liberals (also Left Liberals) from 2004 to 2012. The highest absolute numbers of newcomers 
were brought to the parliament by Socialist/Social Democrats (67 MPs) in 1992, Conservatives 
(43 MPs) in 1996, Liberals (31 MPs) in 2000, by the populist Labour Party and Liberal Democrats 
(40 MPs, coded as ‘Other’) in 2004, and by Other in 2008 and 2012. Similarly as in Latvia, many 
of those party families recruited the highest absolute number of women to the parliament: 
Popular Front brought 4 female MPs in 1992 (40%), Conservatives brought 14 women (60.9%) 
in 1996, Socialists/Social Democrats 6 female MPs in 2000 (40% of all female legislators), 
and the populist Labour party and Liberal Democrats 10 female MPs (43.5%) in 2004 and 
12 female MPs (35.3%) in 2012. A half of those women from the families of Conservatives 
6  The link between legislative turnover and women’s access to the parliament has been emphasised by 
Matland and Studlar (2004: 88) and Schwindt-Bayer (2005).
TABLE 2. Parliamentary newcomers: Latvia
ELECTION 1993 1995 1998 2002 2006 2010
Party Families N % N % N % N % N % N %
Communists 4 57.1 3 60 ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­
Social Dem. 9 69 1 16.7 21 70 12 48 8 34.8 15 51.7
Agrarians 12 100 13 81.3 ­­­ ­­­ 5 41.7 11 61.1 13 59.1
Left Liberals 4 80 13 72.2 ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­
Conservatives 8 53.3 1 12.5 21 51.2 30 56.6 16 32.7 21 51.2
Extreme Right 6 100 22 73.3 ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ 5 62.5
Liberals 19 52.8 4 23.5 8 38.1 ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­
Christian Dem. 6 100 ­­­ ­­­ 7 87.5 6 60 3 30 ­­­ ­­­
TOTAL 68 68 57 57 58 58 52 52 38 38 54 54
Source: own calculations.
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and Socialists/Social Democrats were newcomers, and all female legislators from the 
populist Labour party and Liberal Democrats were for the first time elected to the Lithuanian 
parliament.
2. SEARCHING FOR EXPLANATIONS OF HIGH LEGISLATIVE TURNOVER
The turnover of newcomers and incumbency turnover can be to some extent explained by 
the electoral turnout (see Tables 4 and 5). The highest correlation between electoral turnout 
and the turnover of newcomers is noted in Lithuania (for all seven legislative terms) and 
somewhat lower (and not significant) in Estonia and Latvia. 
Incumbency turnover, which is not exactly the opposite of the turnover of newcomers, 
could be considered a complementary perspective in studying elite circulation. The Baltic 
TABLE 3. Parliamentary newcomers: Lithuania
ELECTION 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012
Party Families N % N % N % N % N % N %
Communists ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­
Social Dem. 67 83.8 10 41.7 26 55.3 4 20 3 11.5 12 32.4
Agrarians ­­­ ­­­ 0 0 3 75 3 50 1 33.3 ­­­ ­­­
Left Liberals ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ 25 100 2 18.2 0 0 ­­­ ­­­
Conservatives ­­­ ­­­ 43 61.4 1 10 9 36 15 33.3 6 18.2
Extreme Right 3 75 2 100 1 33.3 0 0 ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­
Ethnic Minority 3 75 0 0 2 66.7 1 50 2 66.7 6 75
Other 7 77.8 1 33.3 2 66.7 40 90.9 23 56.1 22 46.8
No Party 1 100 3 75 2 66.7 8 57.1 2 100 3 100
Liberals 0 0 12 80 31 86.1 3 16.7 6 30 2 20
Christian Dem. 7 70 4 23.5 2 33.3 ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­
Popular Front 13 40.6 ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­
TOTAL 101 71.6 75 54.7 95 67.4 70 49.7 52 36.9 51 36.7
Source: own calculations.
TABLE 4. Electoral turnout in the Baltic States (per cent)
Estonia 1990 1992 1995 1999 2003 2007 2011
Turnout 78.2 67.8 68.9 57.4 58.2 61.0 62.9
Latvia 1990 1993 1995 1998 2002 2006 2010
Turnout 81.3 89.9 71.9 71.9 71.2 62.3 62.6
Lithuania 1990 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012
Turnout 71.7 75.2 52.9 58.2 45.9 48.6 52.9
Source: Wolfram Nordsieck.
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States, differently from some countries or political parties7, do not make any legal barriers for 
re-election of parliamentary incumbents; nevertheless, only less than a half of incumbents 
get re-elected. This is much below the incumbency levels in many Western democracies (see 
Matland und Studlar 2004: 93). 
TABLE 6. Incumbency turnover in the Baltic parliaments (per cent)
PARLIAMENT 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th
Estonia 19.8 43.6 40.6 28.7 44.6 46.5
Latvia 32.0 38.0 33.0 39.0 53.0 40.0
Lithuania 28.4 36.5 26.2 41.1 52.5 49.6
Source: own calculation.
As Table 5 shows, parliamentary incumbency correlates negatively with electoral turnout 
in all Baltic countries (especially in Latvia and Lithuania).
The other possible explanations have been mentioned in the literature cited above, and I 
would like to check to what extent they are plausible.
R e s t r i c t e d  s y s t e m i c  c h a n g e s
The first turnover thesis states that restricted systemic changes, such as transformation 
of the electoral systems, account for a high turnover of parliamentary representatives. 
There were substantial changes in the electoral systems of the Baltic States in the period 
before 1993, indeed: in 1992 Estonia and in 1993 Latvia introduced the PR system, in 1992 
7  Since 1949, the Constitution of Costa Rica prevents deputies from serving two successive terms; an MP 
may run again for an Assembly seat after sitting out one term. Political party examples include the German 
Greens rotating their members of Bundestag from 1983 to 1987, the Italian Communist Party replacing most of 
its legislators after two or three terms, and the British Labour party in 1980s practising mandatory reselection 
of sitting MPs (Matland and Studlar 2004: 98–99).
TABLE 5. Electoral turnout and turnover of newcomers and incumbents
PEARSON 
CORRELATION
TURNOVER OF NEWCOMERS,  
ALL SEVEN TERMS 
TURNOVER OF INCUMBENTS,  
LAST SIX TERMS 
Estonia 0.687 -0.154
Sig. (two-tailed) 0.088 0.771
Latvia 0.685 -0.715
Sig. (two-tailed) 0.090 0.111
Lithuania 0.813* -0.669
Sig. (two-tailed) 0.026 0.146
* Significant at 0.05 level.
Source: own data and calculation.
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Lithuania introduced a mixed electoral system (70 seats in the PR segment and 71 seats in the 
SMD). However, in the period since 1993 onwards, no substantial changes were observed.8 
Nevertheless, the stability of electoral systems in the Baltic States did not result in stabilisation 
of elite turnover and a notable decrease of parliamentary newcomers.
Vo l a t i l e  e l i t e  s t r u c t u r e s  ( s u p p l y - s i d e  v o l a t i l i t y )
According to the data on Eastern European democracies by Richard Rose (2009: 51), “of the 
total volatility, more than five-sixths has been due to the actions of party elites creating, 
abandoning, or merging parties”. Among Eastern European countries in the period from 
1993 to 2007, Latvia had the highest electoral volatility which was up to 100%9 explained by 
the behaviour of political elites creating new parliamentary parties before each legislative 
election; Lithuania with its 97% was not far from Latvia; Estonia with 66 per cent was below 
not only the Baltic, but also the Eastern European average (Rose 2009: 52)10. 
The seemingly chaotic behaviour of the Baltic party elites, sometimes labelled ‘political 
tourism’, has its rather clear organisational patterns. The analysis by Pettai (2010), Pettai, 
Auers and Ramonaitė (2011) distinguishes six types of political parties according to their 
organizational behaviour and origins: (1) unchanged, (2) alliance, (3) merger, (4) post-alliance, 
(5) fission, and (6) brand-new. The first type refers to the situation where politicians remain 
affiliated with their current party. Types two, three, and four refer to different situations of 
party reconfiguration involving the majority of politicians from certain parties. Type five is 
called fission, “a collective affiliation strategy in which a minority group of politicians breaks 
away from an established party to form a new party”, and type six is labelled a brand-new 
party, the strategy which “involves previously unaffiliated individuals creating a brand-new 
party” (Kreuzer and Pettai 2003: 79). 
Using the analytical distinctions in party behaviour, we can observe that the Estonian 
party elites, distinguished for their practices of party mergers, show over time an increasing 
trend in party loyalty which in 2011 reached 100%, meaning that no changes in party 
restructuring have taken place. The Latvian party elites, having a reputation for preference 
in creating brand-new parties, slowed down this stategy and in the 2010 election opted 
overwhelmingly for alliances. The Lithuanian party elites, characterised by alliances and 
post-alliances and the absence of mergers and fissions in the beginning of the transition 
period, started increasingly practising party mergers and creating brand-new parties (see 
Pettai, Auers, and Ramonaitė 2011: 153). These trends allow to conclude that the Estonian 
elites have reached party consolidation, whereas the Lithuanian elites have clearly increased 
their party de-consolidation; the volatility of the Latvian party elite structure continues to 
remain high. A partial explanation for the behaviour of Baltic party elites is suggested by Allan 
8  Some changes to report were the abolishment of a lower threshold for ethnic minority parties since 1996 
in the PR segment and the introduction of plurality in the SMD segment for the 2000 election  in Lithuania. 
9  On average, 60 to 72% of electoral volatility in Eastern Europe is attributed to the elite behaviour; the rest 
is explained by the changing preferences of voters (Rose 2009: 52).  
10  I have divided the figures of Rose (2009: 52) on Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia – 200%, 193% and 132% 
respectively – by two. 
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Sikk: “The principle of modern representative democracy is largely based on the principle 
of electoral accountability – the parties in power have to act in line with the will of people 
because otherwise they will be voted out of office. However, if the stakes in politics are high 
but steadily declining, the power holders may be tempted to make maximum use of their time 
in office by pursuing unaccountable or outright corrupt policies and not care too much for the 
negative electoral effects resulting from it. The maximum achievable utility from one term in 
office can even outweigh the expected total utility of future terms” (Sikk 2006: 166).
T h e  C r i s i s
The third statement (see above) reveals that a high elite turnover signifies a political crisis. 
Although an increased legislative turnover might mean a simple generational change (one 
generation of legislators leaving and the other coming) and should not be necessarily 
regarded as a trigger causing a political crisis or regime change, in many cases a rising 
parliamentary turnover follows and accompanies a political crisis or regime change. Hence, 
legislative turnover may serve as a kind of ‘seismometer’. This approach finds a sufficient 
empirical support in the data on regime changes in Germany and France: the Nazi takeover 
in 1933 and return to power of Charles de Gaulle in 1958 go together with a highly increased 
parliamentary turnover.  Our Latvian and Lithuanian data on the First Republic confirm the 
crisis/regime change thesis as well: parliamentary democracy in Latvia and Lithuania ends up 
with the Seimas or Saeima in which the number of newcomers rises after the gradual decline 
in previous legislatures. Parliaments of both Latvia and Lithuania serve as good predictors of 
the regime change: the increased numbers of newcomers finish their activities with a coup 
d’état in 1934 and 1926, respectively, signifying the replacement of democratic regimes with 
authoritarian ones in the Baltic States. 
The data on Estonian parliaments, however, do not support the proposed hypothesis: the 
last Riigikogu before the coup d’état in 1934 has 26.1% of parliamentary newcomers, which 
is the lowest legislative turnover rate of all Estonian parliaments in the First Republic ever. In 
other words, it does not predict a switch from democracy to authoritarianism in Estonia. A 
partial explanation could be that the regime change in Estonia, differently from Lithuania and 
TABLE 7. Newcomers in the Baltic parliaments of the First Republics
Estonia 1919 1920 1923 1926 1929 1932
Newcomers, % 100 66.1 63.8 43.4 34.9 26.1
Latvia 1920 1922 1925 1928 1931
Newcomers, % 100 45 33 29 37
Lithuania 1920 1922 1923 1926
Newcomers, % 100 46.7 31.6 53.3
Source: Toomla 1999, www.saeima.lv, www.lrs.lt, and own calculations.
Note. The Constitutional Assembly of 1919 in Estonia and the Constitutional Assemblies of 1920 in Latvia and 
Lithuania were treated as consisting of parliamentary newcomers only.
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Latvia, was introduced by constitutional means (Taagepera 1974: 408): in October 1933, 72.7% 
of voters participating in the referendum voted for the new constitution transforming the head 
of the state from a servant of parliament into a powerful and independent executive having 
the right to issue laws by decree (Raun 2001: 117). It was a pre-emptive authoritarianism 
that “did not result from a direct take-over by rightist forces” (Parming 1975: 5). The Estonian 
authoritarianism was mild not only in the Baltic but also in the European context of that time 
(Raun 2001: 122; Raun 1997: 340).
What strikes in the Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian data is the relatively normal level of 
parliamentary elite circulation in the First Republic in comparison with the generally high level 
of circulation in the Second Republic: the level between 30 and 40% fits into the normal pattern 
of most Western European democracies after 1945 and would be desirable for the regimes of 
the Baltic States after 1990. However, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Baltic States 
produce almost 60% of new parliamentary representatives on average. Since “high turnover 
is associated with periods of crisis, while low turnover is associated with institutional stability 
and political tranquillity” (Putnam 1976: 65), we arrive at a valid question: are Estonia, Latvia, 
and Lithuania, as well as other Eastern European countries, in the state of a permanent 
crisis? If yes, which mechanism then keeps the state and society together? This is not an 
exceptionally Baltic phenomenon: “paradoxical configurations like regime stability without 
elite consolidation” (Best 2007: 24) perfectly fit the patterns of developments among Eastern 
European parliamentary elites. Still, a satisfactory explanation is to be found.
E l e c t o ra l  s y s t e m :  S M D  v s  P R
The fourth thesis explains a high legislative turnover by the type of electoral system. The 
literature suggests that turnover in majoritarian systems is lower than in a proportional 
representation (Matland and Studlar 2004: 107). Our Baltic data do not allow for a cross-
country comparison because both Estonia and Latvia have PR systems and Lithuania conducts 
its parliamentary elections in a mixed system. Hence, the PR and SMD segments can be 
compared only in the case of Lithuania. 
TABLE 8. Election of Parliamentary Newcomers in Lithuania (N)
ELECTION 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012
PR list 52 43 49 33 27 26
SMD 49 32 47 37 28 25
Source: own calculations.
Although the differences between results in the PR and SMD segments are negligible, 
the Lithuanian data clearly show that in many (four out of six) cases the legislative turnover 
is higher in the PR segment. This suggests that SMD provides for a lower legislative turnover.
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E l e c t o ra l  v o l a t i l i t y
The fifth thesis attributes the high legislative turnover to a high electoral volatility, meaning 
that voters change their preferences radically from election to election. 
The figures on electoral volatility in the Baltic countries differ depending on the sources 
and method of calculation11 (Tables 9); however, it is obvious from all three sources that 
Estonia has the lowest electoral volatility and that Latvia and Lithuania have the most similar 
levels of electoral volatility.
TABLE 9. Electoral Volatility (%) in the Baltic States 





Estonia 40.4 150 33.1
Latvia 74.2 200 40.8
Lithuania 72.9 195 47.5
* Calculations are based on Table 10 and Annex Tables 1, 2, and 3.
To continue the further analysis with our own data, one can conclude that electoral 
volatility accounts for the half of parliamentary newcomers (the total average of 47.5% in 
Lithuania, the results for Latvia and Estonia being 40.8 and 33.1%, respectively). This means 
that a high legislative turnover in the Baltic States by 52.5% to 66.9% is caused by other factors 
than electoral volatility. Estonia has the highest legislative turnover, even though its electoral 
volatility is the lowest among the Baltic States.
TABLE 10. Electoral Volatility (%), based on Political Party Families in Parliaments
Estonia 1990–1992 1992–1995 1995–1999 1999–2003 2003–2007 2007–2011
Volatility 49 63.4 28.7 22.9 22.9 11.9
Latvia 1990–1993 1993–1995 1995–1998 1998–2002 2002–2006 2006–2010
Volatility 93 37.5 69 26 6 13
Lithuania 1990–1992 1992–1996 1996–2000 2000–2004 2004–2008 2008–2012
Volatility 78.7 65.9 53.8 50.4 19.2 16.7
Source: own calculations based on the Annex Tables 1, 2, and 3.
11  Firstly, calculations by Rose, Kreuzer, and Pettai are based on the political parties, whereas the figures by 
Kuklys rely upon political party families. Secondly, the number of legislative terms covered is different in all three 
sources. Thirdly, Rose refuses to divide his percentages by two, which is rather a standard (see Bartolini and Mair 
1990) in volatility calculation. 
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D o u b l e  l i s t i n g  o f  ca n d i d a t e s
The Latvian and Lithuanian electoral systems allow a double listing of candidates: Latvian 
candidates may run in all five constituencies simultaneously, Lithuanian candidates may be 
placed on the nation-wide party list in a multi-member district and run in a single member 
district at the same time. The opportunities for double listing are worst in Estonia: there, 
nominated candidates, on the contrary, are allowed to run in one electoral district only; 
however, some candidates put on the nation-wide list have a chance to get elected in the 
third round of election. Following this logic, the legislative turnover should be lower in Estonia 
than in the other two Baltic countries; however, Estonia has the highest legislative turnover 
of all three Baltic States.
Fr e q u e n c y  o f  e l e c t i o n s 
Parliamentary elections in the Baltic States are held every four years.12 Since 1993, Estonia and 
Latvia had one premature election (in 1995)13, and Lithuania so far held elections regularly 
every four years. If we distribute legislative turnover not per term but per year, the annual 
legislative turnover in Lithuania would be 13.2%, in Estonia 15% and in Latvia 17.3%.
G r e a t e r  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  f o r  a t t a i n i n g  e l i t e  s t a t u s
A higher legislative turnover provides greater opportunities in attaining the elite status and 
thus better prospects for democracy (see Somit et al. 1994). Paradoxically, a high turnover 
was seen as politically stabilising not only by Marvick (1968), but also by Pareto and Mosca 
who “believed that, within limits, high turnover prevents the build-up of frustration among 
potential challengers of the regime by allowing them to be co-opted, however briefly, into 
positions of leadership” (Putnam 1976: 67). 
The elite status thesis, with a modifying inclusion of gender perspective, is confirmed by 
the Baltic data: the highest numbers of female legislators in Latvia and Lithuania have been 
brought by the parties with the highest numbers of legislative newcomers (Kuklys 2008: 45).
T h e  l o w e r  a v e ra g e  l e v e l  o f  e l i t e  e x p e r i e n c e,  e x p e r t i s e,  a n d  e f f e c t i v e n e s s 
This explanation connects a high legislative turnover with the lower average level of elite 
experience, expertise, and effectiveness. Our data do not provide with measurements of 
expertise and effectiveness14 of MPs; however, if we take the mean number of elections as a 
proxy for legislative experience, we can observe a relationship between legislative turnover 
and elite experience. The Baltic data, indeed, confirm that, except for Estonia in 1995 and 
Latvia in 1998, the high legislative turnover goes together with the low level of parliamentary 
experience (mean number of elections at which MPs stood successfully).  
12  In Lithuania since 1992, in Estonia since 1995 and in Latvia since 1998.
13  The second premature parliamentary election took place in Latvia in 2011; however, these data are not 
included in our analysis.
14  A possible proxy for the legislative effectiveness could be the percentage of passed laws of the total number 
of law drafts proposed by an MP; however, we have this type of data only for Lithuania.
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TABLE 11. Legislative Experience of Baltic MPs: Mean Number of Successful Elections
Estonia 1990 1992 1995 1999 2003 2007 2011
Elections 1 1.2 1.7 1.8 1.6 1.9 2.1
Latvia 1990 1993 1995 1998 2002 2006 2010
Elections 1 1.3 1.6 1.8 1.9 2.1 1.9
Lithuania 1990 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012
Elections 1 1.3 1.6 1.5 1.8 2.2 2.5
Source: own data and calculations.
Tu r n o v e r  a m o n g  e t h n i c  m i n o r i t i e s
If one compares the shares of newcomers among ethnic minority and MPs belonging to the 
titular nation, implications for stability are more visible among ethnic minority representatives 
in Latvia: in four out of six Latvian Saeimas, the share of newcomers among ethnic majority 
legislators has been higher than among ethnic minority MPs. In Estonia, we observe the 
opposite trend: in five out of six Riigikogu, the share of newcomers is higher among ethnic 
minority than ethnic majority MPs. The Lithuanian data show a situation in-between: in a half 
(three of six) of parliaments, a higher legislative turnover is found among ethnic Lithuanian 
legislators. 
Pa t h  d e p e n d e n c e
In spite of the obvious differences in turnover between MPs in Eastern and Western Europe, 
there are a couple of striking similarities on a less aggregate level. A comparison between post-
1945 Western and post-1989 Eastern European countries makes it clear that Eastern European 
countries follow the political development pattern of some consolidated democracies in 
Western Europe. This is recorded by the political development of the third wave democracies 
Portugal and Spain after 1975, having 64.1 and 57.8% (the EurElite data, Best and Cotta 2000) 
of parliamentary newcomers for the first five terms, respectively. In addition, the difference in 
the age of all MPs and parliamentary newcomers in Portugal – a rather exceptional Western 
European case – is 1.9 years, which coincides with the Eastern European average. Portugal and 
Spain are similar to Eastern European countries in a long survival of post-war authoritarian 
political regimes as well. None of the Western European countries of the twentieth century, 
except Portugal and Spain, could be compared with Eastern European societies in this respect. 
This evidence allows to conclude that the longer the period of regime discontinuity (length of 
the non-democratic regime), the longer it will take to stabilise the parliamentary turnover in 
the new democracy.15
15  Cotta and Verzichelli (2007: 471) argue that “the crucial factor is probably the quality of discontinuity more 
than its length”. For the Baltic countries, this would mean a more precise differentiation among authoritarian 
regimes in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania before the Soviet occupation in 1940.
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CONCLUSIONS
Out of a variety of explanations, the path dependence and the supply-side volatility seem 
to provide the most convincing explanations for the high turnover among Baltic legislators. 
This means that the long previous period of a non-democratic regime will keep the legislative 
turnover in new Baltic democracies at a relatively high level for some time till they reach 
the ‘western’ levels of parliamentary turnover16, and the volatile elite structures (party elites 
switching, abandoning, and creating new political parties) will continue contributing to the 
high legislative turnover as well. 
On the other hand, it may be that the Baltic states, which are no exception from Eastern 
Europe in terms of legislative turnover, provide the established democracies of Western 
Europe with a perspective of their near future: “Insofar, Eastern and Central Europe provides 
the West with an image of its own future, including the corrupting consequences of political 
career insecurity, such as tendency towards to a ‘grab and run’ mentality” (Best 2007: 30–31). 
The transformation of the political party systems in Italy, Austria, the Netherlands17 and some 
other countries of Western Europe after 1990 could point to this direction and provide with 
the thesis of a convergence between European East and West.
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ANNEXES













Communists 6.7 0 0 0 0 0
Social Dem. 3.3 6 10.9 10.9 4 8.9
Greens 4.7 1 0 0 5.9 5.9
Agrarians 13.3 0 6.9 6 7 0
Left Liberals 1.6 39.6 28.7 0 1 3
Right Liberals 1 17.8 6 6 11.9 2
Conservatives 28.7 15.8 4.9 16.9 15.9 4
Extreme Right 17.8 17.8 0 0 0 0
Ethnic Minority 6.7 5.9 0 5.9 0 0
Other 3.5 7.9 0 0 0 0
No Party 7.6 0 0 0 0 0
Liberals 5.7 0 0 0 0 0
Christian Dem. 5.7 0 0 0 0 0
Popular Front 1.6 14.9 ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­
SUM 97.9 126.7 57.4 45.7 45.7 23.8 Average
VOLATILITY 49 63.4 28.7 22.9 22.9 11.9 33.1













Communists 21.9 2 5 0 0 0
Social Dem. 13 7 24 5 2 6
Agrarians 12 4 16 12 6 4
Left Liberals 5 13 18 0 0 0
Conservatives 15 7 33 12 4 8
Extreme Right 6 24 30 0 0 8
Ethnic Minority 0 0 0 0 0 0
Christian Dem. 6 6 8 2 0 0
Liberals 36 19 4 21 0 0
Other 5.9 0 0 0 0 0
Popular Front 65.2 ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­
SUM 186 75 138 52 12 26 Average
VOLATILITY 93 37.5 69 26 6 13 40.8
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Communists 4.5 0 0 0 0 0
Social Dem. 57.4 39.9 16.5 19.8 3.5 8.9
Agrarians 0 0.7 2.1 4.3 5 1.4
Left Liberals 0 0 19.9 12.1 7.1 0.7
Conservatives 0 51.1 44 10.6 14.9 8.9
Extreme Right 2.8 1.3 0.1 1.4 0 0
Ethnic Minority 2.8 2.1 0.7 0 0.7 3.7
Other/Independents 6.4 1.3 1.6 35.5 7.1 4.1
Liberals 1.4 9.5 14.6 12.7 0 5.6
Christian Dem. 7.8 4.6 8.1 4.3 0 0
Popular Front 74.2 21.3 ­­­ ­­­ ­­­ ­­­
SUM 157.3 131.8 107.6 100.7 38.3 33.3 Average
VOLATILITY 78.7 65.9 53.8 50.4 19.2 16.7 47.5
ANNEX TABLE 4. Estonian parliamentary parties/electoral coalitionsª by the party families and 
years of successful election, 1990–2011
CODED AS ESTONIAN NAME (ENGLISH TRANSLATION) ELECTIONS














Greens Green Faction 1990
Greens Eesti Rohelised, Erakond Eestimaa Rohelised  
(Estonian Greens)
1992, 2007
Agrarians Rural Deputies and Rural Centre Party 1990
Agrarians Eesti Maarahva Erakond 
(Estonian Rural People’s Party)
1999
Agrarians Eestimaa Rahvaliit 
(People’s Union of Estonia)
2003, 2007




1995, 1999, 2003, 
2007, 2011
Left Liberals
Koonderakond ja Maarahva Ühendus 
(Coalition Party and Rural Union)
1995
Right Liberals Koonderakond (Coalition Party) 1999
Right Liberals
Eesti Ettevõtjate Erakond 
(Estonian Entrepreneurs‘ Party) 
1992




1995, 1999, 2003, 
2007, 2011
Conservatives Isamaa (Pro Patria) 1992
Conservatives
Rahvuslik Koonderakond ‚Isamaa‘ ja Eesti Rahvusliku 
Sõltumatuse Partei  
(Coalition of ‚Pro Patria‘ and ERSP)
1995
Conservatives Parempoolsed (Right-Wingers) 1995
Conservatives Isamaaliit (Pro Patria Union) 1999, 2003
Conservatives
Ühendus Vabariigi Eest-Res Publica 
(Union for the Republic-Res Publica)
2003
Conservatives
Isamaa ja Res Publica Liit 
(Union of Pro Patria & Res Publica)
2007, 2011
Extreme Right
Eesti Rahvusliku Sõltumatuse Partei 
(Estonian National Independence Party)  
1992
Extreme Right Eesti Kodanik (Estonian Citizen) 1992
Ethnic Minority Virumaa 1990
Ethnic Minority
Meie Kodu on Eestimaa 
(Our Home is Estonia)
1995
Ethnic Minority
Eestimaa Ühendatud Rahvapartei 
(Estonian United People’s Party)
1999
Ethnic Minority Cooperation 1990





Liberals Liberal Democratic Faction 1990
Christian Democrats Christian Democratic Faction 1990
Umbrella Movement People’s Centre Group 1990
Umbrella Movement Rahvarinne (Popular Front of Estonia) 1992
ª Because of multiple political affiliations of electoral candidates for the 1990 Supreme Council, it was impossible 
to determine their ideological orientation; therefore, I chose the parliamentary factions that were built shortly 
after election.
ANNEX TABLE 5. Latvian parliamentary parties/electoral coalitions by the party families and 
years of successful election, 1990–2010
CODED AS LATVIAN NAME (ENGLISH TRANSLATION) ELECTIONS
Communists Līdztiesība (Equal Rights) 1990, 1993





Saskaņa Latvijai – atdzimšana tautsaimniecībai 
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Socialists/Social 
Democrats
Latvijas sociāldemokrātu apvienība 




Politisko organizāciju apvienība “Par cilvēka tiesībām 
vienotā Latvijā (Union of Political Organisations “For 
Human Rights in the United Latvia”)
2002, 2006
Agrarians Latvijas zemnieku savienība 
(Latvian Farmers’ Union)
1993
Agrarians Latvijas zemnieku savienības, Kristīgo demokrātu 
savienības un Latgales demokrātiskās partijas apvienotais 
saraksts  
(A United List of Latvian Farmers’ Union, Union of 
Christian Democrats and Democratic Party of Latgale)
1995
Agrarians Latvijas vienības partija 
(Latvian Unity Party)
1995
Agrarians Zaļo un Zemnieku savienība 
(Union of Greens and Farmers)
2002, 2006, 2010
Left Liberals Demokrātiskā centra partija 
(Democratic Centre Party)
1993
Left Liberals Demokrātiskā partija “Saimnieks” 
(Democratic Party “Master”)
1995
Conservatives Latvijas nacionālās neatkarības kustība  
(Latvian National Independence Movement)
1993
Conservatives Latvijas nacionālās neatkarības kustība un Latvijas zaļā 
partija (Latvian National Independence Movement & 
Green Party)
1995
Conservatives Apvienība “Tēvzemei un brīvībai”/LNNK 
(Union “For Fatherland and Freedom”/LNNK)
1998, 2002, 2006
Conservatives Tautas partija (People’s Party) 1998, 2002, 2006
Conservatives Jaunais laiks (New Era) 2002, 2006
Conservatives Vienotība (Unity) 2010
Conservatives Par Labu Latviju (For a Good Latvia) 2010
Extreme Right Nacionālā apvienība “Visu Latvijai!” - “Tēvzemei un 
brīvībai”/LNNK (National Alliance “Everything for Latvia!” – 
“For Fatherland and Freedom”/LNNK)
2010
Extreme Right Apvienība “Tēvzemei un brīvībai” 
(Union “For Fatherland and Freedom”)
1993, 1995
Extreme Right Tautas kustība Latvijai – Zīgerista partija 
(Popular Movement for Latvia – Siegerist’s Party)
1995
Liberals Savienība “Latvijas ceļš” 
(Union “Latvia’s Way”)
1993, 1995, 1998
Christian Democrats Kristīgo demokrātu savienība 
(Union of Christian Democrats)
1993
Christian Democrats Jaunā partija (New Party) 1998
Christian Democrats Latvijas pirmā partija 
(Latvia’s First Party)
2002
Christian Democrats Latvijas pirmā partija/ Savienība “Latvijas ceļš” 
(Coalition of Latvia’s First Party and Union “Latvia’s Way”)
2006
Umbrella Movement Latvijas tautas fronte 
(Latvian Popular Front)
1990
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ANNEX TABLE 6. Lithuanian parliamentary parties/electoral coalitions by the party families and 
years of successful election, 1990–2012
CODED AS LITHUANIAN NAME (ENGLISH TRANSLATION) ELECTIONS
Communists Lietuvos komunistų partija (Lithuanian Communist Party) 1990
Socialists/ Social 
Democrats
Lietuvos demokratinė darbo partija




Lietuvos socialdemokratų partija 
(Lithuanian Social Democratic Party)
1992, 1996, 2000, 
2004, 2008, 2012
Agrarians Lietuvos valstiečių partija (Lithuanian Peasants’ Party) 1996, 2000
Agrarians Valstiečių ir naujosios demokratijos partijų sąjunga 
(Union of Peasants’ Party and New Democracy Party) 
2004
Agrarians Lietuvos valstiečių ir žaliųjų sąjunga (Union of Peasants and 
Greens)
2008, 2012
Left Liberals Naujoji sąjunga – socialliberalai (New Union – Social 
Liberals)
2000, 2004, 2008
Liberals Lietuvos centro judėjimas (Lithuanian Centre Movement) 1992
Liberals Lietuvos centro sąjunga (Lithuanian Centre Union) 1996, 2000
Liberals Lietuvos liberalų sąjunga (Lithuanian Liberal Union) 1996, 2000
Liberals Liberalų ir centro sąjunga (Liberal and Centre Union) 2004, 2008
Liberals Lietuvos liberalų sąjūdis (Movement of Lithuanian Liberals) 2008, 2012
Christian Democrats Lietuvos krikščionių demokratų partija 
(Lithuanian Christian Democratic Party)
1992, 1996, 2000
Christian Democrats Lietuvos krikščionių demokratų sąjunga 
(Christian Democratic Union)
1992, 1996, 2000
Christian Democrats Moderniųjų krikščionių demokratų sąjunga 
(Union of Modern Christian Democrats)
2000
Conservatives Tėvynės sąjunga – Lietuvos konservatoriai 
(Fatherland Union – Lithuanian Conservatives)
1996, 2000, 2004
Conservatives Tėvynes sąjunga – Lietuvos krikščionys demokratai
(Fatherland Union – Lithuanian Christian Democrats)
2008, 2012
Conservatives Nuosaikiųjų konservatorių sąjunga 
(Union of Moderate Conservatives)
2000
Extreme Right Nepriklausomybės partija (Independence Party) 1992
Extreme Right Lietuvių nacionalinė partija “Jaunoji Letuva” 
(Lithuanian National Party “Young Lithuania“)
1996, 2000
Extreme Right Lietuvos tautininkų sąjunga (Lithuanian Nationalist Union) 1992, 1996
Extreme Right Lietuvos laisvės sąjunga (Lithuanian Liberty Union) 2000
Ethnic Minority Lietuvos lenkų sąjunga (Union of Lithuanian Poles) 1992
Ethnic Minority Lietuvos lenkų rinkimų akcija  
(Electoral Action of Lithuanian Poles)
1996, 2000, 2004, 
2008, 2012
Ethnic Minority Lietuvos rusų sąjunga (Union of Lithuanian Russians) 2000
Other Lietuvos moterų partija (Lithuanian Women‘s Party) 1996
Other Lietuvos demokratų partija (Lithuanian Democratic Party) 1996
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Other Lietuvos politinių kalinių ir tremtinių sąjunga 
(Lithuanian Union of Political Prisoners and Deportees)
1992, 1996
Other Naujosios demokratijos partija (Party of New Democracy) 2000
Other Darbo partija (Labour Party) 2004, 2008, 2012
Other Liberalų demokratų partija (Liberal Democratic Party ) 2004
Other Partija “Tvarka ir teisingumas” (Party “Order & Justice”) 2008, 2012
Other Tautos prisikėlimo partija (Party of National Revival) 2008
Other Politinė partija “Drąsos kelias” 
(Political Party “Way of Courage”)
2012
Umbrella Movement Lietuvos sąjūdis (Lithuanian Movement) 1990, 1992
